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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Until the time when such a Uniform Act can be put into the legislative
enactments of all the states, 2 we will have to be satisfied with the time
consuming process of having the Supreme Court3a determine the situs of
the specific property in question as well as the merits of the individual
claims presented.
a2 To see just how far a state has gone in attempting to escheat funds, see State v.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 56 N.J. Super. 589, 153 A.2d 691 (1959). This involved the
State of New Jersey seeking to escheat estimated dollar amounts of unredeemed S&H
trading stamps.
aa Mr. Justice Stewart dissented in the Western Union case, stating that only New
York, the state of the Company's domicile, could escheat the funds in question. It
would seem that the better view, however, according to the Uniform Act, would be
to have the funds escheat to the state of the last known residence of the owner of such
property.
LABOR LAW-STATE COURT AND REINSTATEMENT
Plaintiffs Cooper, Ritter and Williams were discharged from their em-
ployment with the defendant, Nutley Sun Printing Company, allegedly
because of their membership in Local 103 of the Typographical Union,
also a plaintiff to this action. The remaining six plaintiffs, also employees
of defendant, were ordered to have nothing to do with Local 103 and
to refrain from joining it. One of the plaintiff employees was threatened
with bodily harm if he engaged in any union strike against defendant.
In response to these threats, plaintiffs declared a strike and began to
picket defendant's place of business. A complaint was filed with the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board alleging that defendant was guilty of unfair
labor practices. The Board declined to assert jurisdiction over the case
because the effect of defendant's business on interstate commerce was
not sufficient enough to warrant the Board's intervention.' Plaintiffs then
1) Non retail enterprises: $50,000 outflow or inflow directly or indirectly in inter-
state commerce.
2) Office Buildings: Gross revenue of $100,000 of which $25,000 or more is derived
from organizations that meet any of the standards.
3) Retail Concerns: $500,000 gross volume of business.
4) Instrumentalities, links and channels of interstate commerce: $50,000 from inter-
state (or linkage) part of enterprise, or from services performed for employers in
commerce.
5) Public Utilities: $250,000 gross volume, or meet non-rail standards.
6) Transit systems: $250,000 gross volume except taxicabs, as to which the retail tests
shall apply.
' The NLRB ruled that the amount of business conducted by Nutley Sun Printing
Company did not come within the standards which the Board had established as of
1958. Any case which did meet the financial standards was outside the jurisdiction of
the NLRB. The standards of the Board as reported in NLRB, 23d Ann. Rep. 8 (1958)
are as follows:
CASE NOTES
brought this action in the Superior Court, Chancery Division of New
Jersey, alleging that defendant had violated their rights of organization
and collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing
as guaranteed by the New Jersey Constitution.2 The employees prayed
for reinstatement to their jobs with full back pay and seniority rights.
The lower court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to grant the relief and
gave judgment for defendant. On appeal, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey reversed the decision and remanded the case for trial.8
New Jersey had no statute authorizing the remedy of reinstatement,
nor did any statute create a state labor board to hear cases involving
labor disputes. The reasoning of the Court was to the effect that the
constitutional provision guaranteeing the rights of organization and col-
lective bargaining was self implementing, and thus no additional legislation
was needed to provide a basis for the remedy of reinstatement. The Court
felt that if the conduct of defendant amounted to a denial of plaintiff's
constitutional rights, then the inherent equitable powers of the Court
could be called upon to provide any relief necessary to remedy the wrong.
Cooper v. Nutley Sun Printing Co., 36 N.J. 189, 175 A.2d 639 (1961).
To fully understand the significance of this decision, it is necessary to
note the traditional common law and recent statutory remedies available
to an employee who had been wrongfully discharged by his employer.
At common law, an employer could discharge an employee for any
reason, and the only remedy available to the employee was an action for
damages for breach of contract if there was a contract of employment
7) Newspapers and communication systems: $100,000 gross volume for radio, tele-
vision, telegraph and telephone; $200,000 gross volume for newspapers.
8) National defense: Substantial impact on national defense.
9) Business in the Territories and District of Columbia: Above standards apply in
Territories; all businesses in District of Columbia are subject to jurisdiction regard-
less of interstate volume.
10) Associations: Regarded as a single employer.
Direct outflow refers to goods shipped or services furnished by the employer
outside the state. Indirect outflow includes sales within the State to users meeting any
standard except solely an indirect inflow or indirect outflow standard. Direct inflow
refers to goods or services furnished directly to the employer from outside the State
in which the employer is located.
Indirect inflow refers to the purchase of goods or services which originated out-
side the employer's State but which he purchased from a seller within the State. Direct
and indirect outflow may be combined, and direct and indirect inflow may also be
combined to meet the $50,000 requirement. However outflow and inflow may not be
combined.
2 N. J. CoNsT., art. I, § 19.
3 The lower court simply held that it had no jurisdiction to grant the requested
relief and made no determination of the facts. The Supreme Court remanded the
case for trial and ruled that the lower court could order reinstatement if it found
that, upon the facts, plaintiffs were entitled to the relief.
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which was not terminable at will.4 Reinstatement as a remedy for a
wrongfully discharged employee found its origin in the National Labor
Relations Act. The Act established that discharge for union activities
was an unfair labor practice, 5 and it further provided that an employee
who had been discharged for his union membership could be reinstated
to his job by order of the Board.6
The constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act and the
remedy of reinstatement was established by the United States Supreme
Court in NLR v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.7 In that case, an affiliate
of the Iron, Steel and Tin Workers Union alleged that Jones and Laughlin
Steel had committed unfair labor practices by discharging several of their
employees because of their affiliation with the plaintiff union. The Na-
tional Labor Relations Board ordered that the discharged employees be
reinstated to their jobs with full back pay. Jones and Laughlin contended,
on appeal, that the order of the Board amounted to a money judgment
and contravened the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion which provides: "In Suit, at common law, where the value in con-
troversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved ... .,, The Supreme Court ruled that the Seventh Amendment
did not apply, and a jury trial was not necessary because a suit for rein-
statement was unknown at common law, it was purely a statutory remedy
and thus the contention under the Seventh Amendment was without
merit.
Thus the Supreme Court established that the remedy of reinstatement
is purely one of statutory origin. A natural corollary of this decision is
that 1) without a statute which provides the remedy of reinstatement for
wrongful discharge, and 2) without a statute specifying that discharge
for union activities is wrongful, the courts must apply the traditional
common law remedies. The employee could not seek reinstatement, for
there was no such remedy at common law.
Legislation at the state level on the subject of labor relations and the
remedy of reinstatement was slow to develop due to the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board.9
In that case a union filed charges with the NLRB accusing an employer
of unfair labor practices. The Board refused to take jurisdiction because
4 Christy v. Petrus, 295 S.W.2d 122, 365 Mo. 1187 (1956); Schlenk v. Lehigh Valley
R.R. 62 A.2d 380, 1 N.J. 131 (1948); Harper v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 73 F.2d 792
(5th Cir. 1934); Hanger v. Fitzsimmons, 273 Fed. 348 (1921); Warden v. Hinds, 163 Fed.
201 (1908); Boyer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 124 Fed. 246 (1903).
r 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (3) (1958).
6 29 U.S.C. § 160 (c) (1958). 8 U.S. CONST., AMEND. VII.
7 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 9 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
CASE NOTES
the employer's business was predominantly local in character. The union
then proceeded to file charges with the Utah Labor Relations Board
which asserted jurisdiction and afforded the requested relief. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and set the order of the state
board aside. The Court declared that Congress had vested the NLRB with
exclusive jurisdiction in the area of labor disputes in interstate commerce.
State power to act in that area had been completely displaced except
where the NLRB had formally ceded jurisdiction to the state pursuant to
Section 10 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act.10 Since the Board
had made no such agreement in the Guss case, the Court concluded that
the Utah Labor Relations Board was without jurisdiction. States were
thus precluded from exercising jurisdiction over any labor dispute which
involved interstate commerce unless the case involved a proper subject
for the exercise of the state police power, such as a labor dispute clothed
with violence.11
Since the NLRB could not, with its existing facilities, handle the vol-
ume of cases brought before it, necessity urged that the Board decline
jurisdiction of the cases whose effect on interstate commerce was minimal.
Thus a "no-man's land"'1 was created; an area where the Board would
not, and states could not assert jurisdiction over cases involving labor
disputes in interstate commerce.
Congress attempted to rectify this situation with the Landrum-Griffin
amendment to the National Labor Relations Act.13 This amendment pro-
vides: "Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to prevent or bar any
agency or the courts of any State or Territory .. .from assuming and
asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the Board declines
to assert ... jurisdiction." States could now decide those cases which the
Board declined to hear, and the states were free to apply state law to
those cases ceded to them.
Even though states could decide labor cases involving interstate com-
merce if the Board declined jurisdiction, there was still no basis for the
remedy of reinstatement without a state statute providing for it, since
10 29 U.S.C. § 160 (a) (1958). That section provides: "That the Board is empowered
by agreement with any agency of any State or Territory to cede to such agency
jurisdiction over any cases in any industry (other than mining, manufacturing, com-
munications, and transportation except where predominantly local in character) even
though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting commerce, unless the provi-
sion of the State or Territorial statute applicable to the determination of such cases
by such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provision of this subchapter or
has received a construction inconsistent therewith."
11 San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
12 Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
13 29 U.S.C.A. § 164 (c) (2) (1959).
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the remedy is statutory in origin. In the Nutley case, the New Jersey
Court admitted that New Jersey statutes covering the subject of rein-
statement were non-existent. The Court stated that "the court in the
present case needs no legislative implementation to afford an appropriate
remedy to redress a violation of those rights.' u4 The rights referred to in
the opinion were the rights of organization and collective bargaining
provided in the New Jersey Constitution. 15 The Court declared that the
constitutional provision guaranteeing those rights was self implementing.
The provision was not only a bar to legislative or judicial infringement,
but it also protected the employees against the acts of private individuals
which tended to abridge the employee's constitutional rights. If the effect
and intent of the discharges in the Nutley case was to interfere with
employees' rights to free choice of their bargaining agent, then a wrong
had been committed, and the Court felt that it could use its broad
equitable powers to rectify that wrong with reinstatement or any other
suitable relief. The Court was of the opinion that the legislature could
no more allow a violation of the employees' constitutional rights through
its silence than it could through legislative enactment.
It is interesting to note that other states with similar constitutional
provisions guaranteeing the right of organization and collective bargain-
ing have held that such provisions are not self implementing and do re-
quire additional legislation before affirmative duties, such as reinstating
a wrongfully discharged employee, can be imposed. The Missouri Con-
stitution, for example, provides: "That employees shall have the right to
organize and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing."'1 Quinn v. Buchanan17 is the case which decided that the
constitutional provision was not self implementing. In that case the de-
fendant was engaged in the business of processing and selling meat prod-
ucts, but he was not engaged in interstate commerce. He employed five
driver-salesmen who organized and chose Local 833 of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters as their bargaining agent. Defendant's sales
manager told two of the driver-salesmen that anyone who signed a card
authorizing Local 833 to bargain for them would be discharged, and
furthermore, defendant refused to meet with the bargaining agent of
Local 833. Plaintiffs, three of the drivers, were discharged and defendant
continued to refuse to bargain. Plaintiffs sued for damages and reinstate-
ment, alleging that defendant's conduct violated their rights under the
Missouri Constitution. The Missouri Supreme Court allowed the claim
for damages but refused to allow the order for reinstatement.
14 Cooper v. Nutley Sun Printing Co., 36 N.J. 189, 175 A.2d 639, 643 (1961).
t' N.J. CONST., art. I, 19.
16 Mo. CONST., art 1, 29. 17 298 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1957).
CASE NOTES
The reasoning of the Court was to the effect that the constitutional
provision was only self implementing to the extent that the government
could not remove or infringe upon the rights guaranteed by it. The
Court added that the provision of the Constitution did not provide
methods or remedies for its enforcement, and therefore such relief was
purely within the province of the legislature. The constitutional provi-
sion was not deemed to be a labor relations act. It was, in the eyes of the
Court, simply a declaration of fundamental rights and did not, in and of
itself, provide for any required, affirmative duties concerning its enforce-
ment. To require the defendant in the Quinn case to reinstate the dis-
charged employees would amount to the imposition of an affirmative
duty upon the employer, and the Court felt that such an affirmative duty
could only be imposed by an act of the legislature.
The New York Constitution provides: "Employees shall have the right
to organize and to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing."18 Yet the New York Supreme Court, Special Term, held
that the constitutional provision was not self implementing in Quill v.
Eisenhower.9 That case involved a suit by the president of the Transport
Workers Union of America to compel Columbia University to bargain
collectively with the union. The contention of the union was that the
constitutional provision guaranteeing the right of collective bargaining
imposed an affirmative duty upon the university to bargain with the
union, and refusal to do so amounted to a violation of the employees'
constitutional rights. The New York Court refused to uphold the union's
contention and declared that the constitutional provision was only in-
tended to protect employees from legislation or acts of individuals which
interfered with their organization and choice of collective bargaining
representatives. The Court was of the opinion that to force Columbia
University to bargain with the union would amount to the imposition
of an affirmative duty upon the university, and no such duty could be
imposed by the constitutional provision. It was not self implementing
to that extent, and affirmative duties could only be imposed through
legislative enactment. In the words of the Court, "The constitutional pro-
vision was shaped as a shield; the union seeks to use it as a sword."20
The previous phrase is extremely noteworthy from the standpoint of
the Nutley decision, for the New Jersey Court has used its constitu-
tional provision as a sword. The positive duty of reinstating an employee
has been imposed upon the employer without legislative enactment. The
18 N.Y. CONST., art I, § 17.
19 113 N.Y.S.2d 887, 5 Misc.2d 431 (1952).
20 Quill v. Eisenhower, 113 N.Y.S.2d 887, 889, 5 Misc.2d 431, 433 (1952).
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decisions of Quinn v. Buchanan2' and Quill v. Eisenhower22 present per-
suasive authority to the effect that a constitutional provision guaranteeing
employees the right of organization and collective bargaining is not self
implementing to the extent that affirmative duties can be imposed upon
the employer without legislative enactment. The New Jersey Court, in
the Nutley case, has ruled completely contra to this view.
New Jersey is by no means bound by the decisions of Missouri and
New York. The Court is undoubtedly free to interpret its Constitution
as it sees fit. As a matter of fact, the Nutley decision is not the first in-
stance wherein the New Jersey Court decided that it could use its in-
herent equitable powers to remedy an invasion of the constitutional rights
of organization and collective bargaining without statutory implementa-
tion. This reasoning was applied in Independent Dairy Workers Union of
Highstown v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local No. 680.23 In that
case the plaintiff union was formed by the employees of Decker's Dairy.
The union held an election 24 to prove that it was the majority choice of
Decker's employees, and a collective bargaining agreement was entered
into between the plaintiff union and Decker's Dairy. Defendant, Local
680, demanded that it be accepted as the bargaining agent for Decker's
employees and picketed Decker's plant even after the agreement was
reached with the plaintiff union. Plaintiff sued to enjoin the picketing
and defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming that no basis
existed for the relief.
The Court granted the injunction and the basis of the decision was that
the picketing endangered the rights of organization and collective bar-
gaining granted by the New Jersey Constitution and thus could be en-
joined. The Court felt that the object of the picketing was to undermine
the constitutional rights of the employees. This constituted a wrong for
which the Court was empowered to afford a remedy.
The Highstown case did not impose any affirmative duties upon the
defendant union, but it does exemplify the view of the Court that for
every invasion of rights guaranteed by the Constitution, the Court can
use its inherent, equitable powers to provide an appropriate remedy.
This view is very strongly manifested in the Nutley decision. In the
words of the Court, "if the trial court finds the individual plaintiffs'
constitutional rights have been infringed upon, it can exercise its vast
equitable powers and grant the relief which the circumstances dictate....
21298 S.W. 413 (1957). 22 113 N.Y.S.2d 887, 5 Misc.2d 431 (1952).
23 23 N.J. 85, 127 A.2d 869 (1956).
24 New Jersey had no statute authorizing such an election. It was held at the sug-
gestion of Decker's Dairy since Decker would not bargain with the union until it
offered proof that it was the choice of the majority of the employees.
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A lack of precedent, or mere novelty in incident, is no obstacle to the
award of equitable relief, if the case presented is referable to an estab-
lished head of equity jurisprudence-either of primary right or of remedy
merely . . . the court has the broadest equitable power to grant the
appropriate relief." 25
Thus the Nutley case, although not without foundation in New Jersey
case law, is still a unique approach to labor relations law at the state level,
and poses many interesting questions. If a court of Equity can rely upon
a constitutional provision guaranteeing the rights of organization and
collective bargaining, and its inherent equitable powers to provide an
adequate remedy for any wrong, can it also order an election and certify
a particular union as the authorized bargaining agent? Congress had to
pass the National Labor Relations Act and establish the NLRB before the
complex problems presented by certification elections could be met. If
failure to certify a union can be deemed a wrong, then according to the
reasoning of the Court in the Nutley case, the Equity court can provide
an adequate remedy, such as a certification election. The Highstown case
gives a good indication of how far the New Jersey Court can go in
exercising the functions of a labor relations board. There the Court
enjoined one union from picketing a plant after another union had been
accepted as the bargaining agent by the employer on the basis of a
privately held employee election. It would be a short step for the Court
to order an election and certify the union itself.
Many states have constitutional provisions similar to the one relied upon
by the New Jersey Court. It will be interesting to note the extent to
which the New Jersey view will be adopted regarding those provisions.
25 Cooper v. Nutley Sun Printing Co., 36 N.J. 189, 190, 175 A.2d 643,644 (1961).
TORTS-AFFIRMATIVE DUTY-THE EMERGENCY
ROOM IN A PRIVATE HOSPITAL
In attempting to obtain additional medical assistance because their doc-
tor's treatment had been ineffective to ease their four month old son's
high fever, insomnia, and diarrhea, Mr. and Mrs. Darius M. Manlove took
their baby to the emergency room of Wilmington General Hospital and
related his condition to the nurse on duty. The nurse explained to the
parents that the hospital could not give treatment because the child was
already under the care of a doctor, and there was a danger the medica-
tions would conflict. The nurse did not examine the baby but did make
an unsuccessful attempt to reach the attending doctor. The Manloves
returned home with the child who died about three hours later. The
